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Using the OSA enterprise database for the Netherlands, we analyze the impact of technologi-
cal innovation on profits and average wages at company level. We find that firms with a 
high product-R&D intensity (as opposed to process innovators) indeed realize above-normal 
profits. This can be explained by entry barriers that are caused by historically accumulated 
(often 'tacit') product knowledge. Product innovations are therefore often harder to imitate 
than process innovations, the latter often being based on the acquisition of equipment. More-
over, we find support for the hypothesis that, to prevent the leaking of knowledge, innova-
tive firms pay above average wages which reduce the probability that workers will leave the 
firm. 
Natasja M. Brouwer is a Fellow of the Foundation for Economie Research (SEO) of the 
University of Amsterdam. When doing the research for this paper, Alfred Kleinknecht was 
also a Fellow of SEO. He is now Professor of Industrial Economics and Director of the 
Economie and Social Institute at the Free University of Amsterdam (ESI-VU). 
Mailing addresses: 
Natasja M. Brouwer Alfred Kleinknecht, 
SEO-UvA ESI-VU 
Roetersstraat 11 De Boelelaan 1105 
1018 WB Amsterdam 1081 HV Amsterdam. 
Acknowledgement: 
Our research has been supported by a grant from the Organization for Strategie Labour 
Market Research (OSA) of the Netherlands. We thank Bernard van Praag, William Praat 
and Jean Paul Vosse for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. The 
usual disclaimers apply. 
^ 
O Introduction 
In a neo-Schumpeterian context, it may be argued that knowledge required for the develop-
ment of innovations is not merely publicly available knowledge; it may also include certain 
types of technological knowledge which are difficult to buy on a market or to obtain in other 
ways. Such knowledge comprises so-called 'tacit' knowledge which is historically accumula-
ted through practical experience. Tacit knowledge has also been described as uncodified, un-
published, tied to certain persons and possessing certain idiosyncratic elements (Dosi 1988: 
1120-71). 
Tacit knowledge may be particularly important in activities such as mechanical engineering 
where knowledge about the past performance of machines or instruments (e.g. typical hand-
ling mistakes by users) is essential in the design of new and superior vintages. To the extent 
that such knowledge is historically accumulated in the firm, it tends to confine the range of 
innovative options available: the type of (competitive) product a firm can develop and pro-
duce today is to a certain degree determined by what it developed and produced in the past. 
Historically-accumulated technological knowledge may therefore act as an entry barrier into 
markets. If a firm has a unique knowledge base, it can develop products that are difficult 
(and time-consuming) to imitate by competitors. The range of capable imitators is in any 
case likely to be confined to a relatively few firms that have accumulated the appropriate 
knowledge. In addition, the innovating firm may enjoy certain 'first mover' advantages such 
as a lead on the learning curve, or the possibility to register patents. This all suggests that 
knowledge-intensive firms may enjoy some monopoly power and reap monopoly rents. 
One implication of all this is that firms have an interest in reducing the labour market mobi-
lity of their stuff: if the latter possess strategically important (tacit) knowledge, they should 
1 
be encouraged not to leave the firm. An incentive can be given by sharing monopoly rents 
with them: an obvious method is to pay above-normal wages. 
These hypotheses appear intuitively plausible. If realistic, they have some obvious implica-
tions for our understanding of innovation, profits and wage differentials. To the best of our 
knowledge, however, little of this relationship has yet been investigated at the firm level. 
Using OSA's unique national enterprise data base, the hypotheses can be tested with data at 
the firm level, covering all sectors of the national economy of the Netherlands. The hypothe-
sis that product innovators make above average profits will be tested in section 1, using pa-
nel data from 1.200 firms which participated in two rounds of the OSA survey (1988 and 
1990). The data allow 1990 profits to be explained with the use of independent variables re-
lating to 1988. In section 2, simple cross sections are used, explaining wage differentials in 
1988 and 1990 separately. We analyze factors that influence the average wage paid by an 
enterprise. In both sections particular attention is given to the possible impact of factors rela-
ted to the innovative performance of firms. 
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1 Innovative performance and profits at the firm level 
In the following, a firm's R&D intensity in 1988 (i.e. R&D man years as a percentage of a 
firm's total labour force) is used as an indicator of unique knowledge which may become a 
source of monopoly power. In addition to R&D, the OSA database covers profits (before 
tax) and sales in 1990. Starting from 1286 firms that returned a questionnaire in both rounds 
of the survey and after deleting firms with missing observations and implausible values, data 
on profits and sales from 570 firms are retained. Among these we find relatively high profits 
(as a percentage of sales): on average 12,9%. For about half of the 570 firms, profits as a 
percentage of sales are between -0,01 and 4,37 percent. This relatively high level may in 
part be explained by the fact that data were measured during a prosperous phase of the busi-
ness cycle. However, there ,is also the more general problem that financial data are often 
badly reported in postal surveys and that non-response can be selective; i.e. firms with fa-
vourable records may be more likely to participate in both rounds of the survey. In order to 
correct for possibly selective non-response, a Heekman correction term will be included in 
our profit equation. 
The results of our regression estimates are summarized in Table 1/1 in which insignificant 
variables are not included. Among such variables were a number of dummies for sectors, 
implying that, at a 95% significance level, there are no notable differences in profit rates 
among sectors. This finding also implies that a few sectors characterized by the presence of 
very large multinational firms (possessing market power) do not differ from others. Other 
potentially relevant variables having no impact on profits rates are: the growth rate of a 
firm's labour productivity (1988-90), a firm's age (if included as a continuous variable), and 
investment per employee in 1990. The Heekman correction term is not included in Table 
1/1, given that its coëfficiënt of minus 22.6 (t-value: 1,91) just fails to be significant at a 
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95% level. The negative coëfficiënt of the Heekman term indicates that firms with less fa-
vourable financial records may be less likely to participate in the two rounds of the survey. 
It is interesting to note from Table 1/1 that intramural product-related R&D has a strongly 
positive influence on profits. According to our model, an increase of a firm's product-R&D 
intensity (i.e. man years of intramural R&D dedicated to the development of new products 
or services as a percentage of total employment) by one percentage point corresponds with 
an increase of profits (as a percentage of sales) by 0,9 percentage points. As opposed to 
intramural R&D, the contracting-out of R&D seems to have a negative impact on profits. In 
Table 1/1, the dummy for firms contracting-out R&D is significantly negative, implying that 
pre-tax profits as a percentage of sales are 5.87% lower than in firms that do not contract-
out R&D. In an alternative regression equation (not documented in Table 1/1), instead of a 
dummy for contracting-out R&D, we included a firm's R&D intensity with respect to pro-
cess-R&D contracted-out (i.e. process-R&D man years contracted-out as a percentage of the 
firm's total labour force) finding also a negative impact on profits: an increase of the exter-
nal process R&D-intensity by one percentage point leads to a reduction of profits as a per-
centage of sales by 1,09 percentage points (t-value: 2,77). 
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Table 1/1: Factors that influence 1990 profits as a percentage of sales (only factors 
significant at 95% level). 
Summary of multiple regressions 
independent variables*: 
constant term 
intramural product-R&D intensity** 
dummy for firms contracting-out R&D 
dummy: firm has an advanced position 
in mechanization and automatization 
dummy: firm believes that its markets 
will grow (rapidly) in the future 
dummy: firm is 20-40 years old 
Notes: 
- number of observations: 570 firms; 
-R-square: 0.11; 
* independent variables refer to the year 1988; 
** Definition: intramural R&D man years related to product development in 1988 as a 
percentage of total employment in the same year. Product-R&D in 1988 was obtained 
by applying a firm's subdivision of R&D into product- and process-related R&D in 
1990 to a firm's (total) R&D in 1988. 
Further experiments revealed that the impact of intramural process-related R&D on profits is 
insignificantly positive, and that product-R&D contracted-out has an insignificantly negative 
coëfficiënt. This explains why total R&D (including: product- and process-R&D, intramural 
R&D and contracted-out R&D) has only a weakly significant positive influence on profits 
(coëfficiënt: 0.12, t-value: 1,62). 
These findings are interesting when confronted with the hypothesis of David Teece (1988). 
Teece argues that R&D projects of key importance to a firm's strategy tend not to be con-
tracted-out: firms do not want to become dependent on third parties with respect to their cru-
cial assets. Important reasons for this attitude are (1) that the firm's partners may develop 
some monopoly power; (2) that knowledge may more easily leak out (moral hazard); and (3) 
coeffi-
cients: 
12,27 
0,90 
-5,87 
-4,53 
4,21 
6,03 
values: 
7,52 
5,84 
-3,10 
-2,26 
2,11 
2,85 
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that problems concerning the appropriation of R&D spill-overs and serendipity effects may 
arise. Hence, contracted-out R&D tends to be confined to less important R&D activities 
(e.g. routine material testing). 
Against this background, our finding that the profits of firms contracting-out R&D are lower 
can be interpreted in two ways. Either the R&D contracted-out by those firms covers (in 
accordance with Teece's hypothesis) little unique knowledge that could become a source of 
monopoly rents, or such firms have not learnt the lesson from Teece's hypothesis. 
In addition to R&D, the OSA survey asked for qualitative information on the importance of 
process technology to the firm. The relevant question was whether the firm had an 'ad-
vanced position with respect to mechanization and automatization'. Table 1/1 shows remar-
kably that firms that (believe they) have such an advanced position have significantly lower 
profits as a percentage of sales (-4,53%). Moreover, firms that responded that 'an important 
new technology has been introduced during the past two years' have no significantly higher 
profit rate. It is interesting to add here that the growth rate of labour productivity (i.e. the 
change in sales per employee during the period 1988-1990) also does not have a significant 
impact on profits. 
The different impact of product and process innovation on profits may be explained as fol-
lows. Product-related R&D may indeed lead to the accumulation of relatively unique know-
ledge in the firm. Such knowledge (in particular 'tacit' knowledge) may be hard to imitate, 
and the number of competent imitators is likely to be limited. Moreover, patent protection 
may enhance a product innovator's monopoly power. On the other hand, an advanced positi-
on with respect to mechanization and automatization often requires less indigenous effort by 
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the firm. Such a position can be obtained, to an important degree, by buying the relevant 
equipment - which can also be done by firms with relatively little technological competence. 
As a consequence, a pioneers' monopoly rent can be competed-away by imitators much 
more quickly than in the case of product innovation. In addition, pioneering firms that buy 
the most recent vintage of mechanization and automatization equipment may have more se-
vere problems with technological uncertainty and perhaps buy equipment with various types 
of (infancy) 'bugs', thus causing additional costs. 
Besides the above-named variables, firms that have been in existence for 20 to 40 years 
seem to be the most successful in terms of profits. As has been mentioned above, 'firm age' 
(as a continuous variable) was insignificant, which could imply that there are some non-line-
arities in the relationship between firm age and profitability. Our finding that firms that con-
sider that their market will grow (rapidly) in the future are more profitable, is not really sur-
prising. 
Our conclusion from the above is that the data support the hypothesis that product innovators 
realize above-average profits, while process innovators do not. In the latter case, imitation 
works more quickly. Although we only use profit data from one year, it may be argued that 
the above-average profits of product innovators are likely to be more durable, given that 
they are based on historically-accumulated product knowledge. 
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2 Innovative performance and average wage levels 
In the introduction it is argued that product innovators may protect their monopoly rents by 
sharing (part of) those rents witii their employees, thus reducing the probability that em-
ployees would leave the firm, taking with them strategically important knowledge. In the 
following, OSA cross-section data are used in order to analyze factors that account for diffe-
rences in average wages paid by firms. In doing so, we take advantage of the analysis of 
wage differentials on the OSA data by Teulings et al. (1992). In principle, the same indepen-
dent variables that they tested are included. It should be noted, however, that although they 
analyzed the impact of numerous variables, Teulings et al. did not include indicators of tech-
nological innovation. 
Data on average wages paid by individual firms are available from both rounds of the OSA 
survey (1988, 1990). Explanatory variables available for the two years are slightly different. 
For example, the 1990 survey includes questions about the division of R&D into product-
and process-related R&D, while the 1988 data cover only total R&D. The 1990 data provide 
information about the size of the responding establishment (e.g. a branch plant) which may 
be part of a larger unit, while the 1988 data cover the size of the enterprise as a whole. 
Furthermore, the latter show a measure of trade unionization, while the 1990 data do not. 
Such variances allow for the specification of slightly different regression models which may 
give hints about the robustness of outcomes. 
Our estimates for 1990 are summarized in Table 2/1 and are quite similar to those of 
Teulings et al. (1992). For example, an increase by one percentage point of the share of 
employees taking part in external training courses leads to a wage increase of 0,11 %. As 
might be expected, education levels and the age of workers also have an impact on wages. 
8 
Sexual discrimination is indicataed by our finding that, ceteris paribus, an increase by one 
percentage po int of the share of male workers results in a wage increase of 0,24%. If a high 
percentage of workers left the firm during the previous year, average wages are lower. The 
direction of causality may be debated: did people leave voluntarily or were they fired? 
Table 2/la Variables influencing the log of average wages paid by a firm in 1990. 
Summary of regressions 
independent variables: coefficients: t-values: 
constant term 7,61 99,90 
percentage share of male workers 0,24 9,00 
percentage of workers taking part in 
external manpower training courses 0,11 2,39 
percentage of workers in the age groups: 
- less than 20 years -0,37 -3,32 
- 20-29 years 0,05 0,66 
- 30-39 years 0,24 2,93 
- 40-49 years 0,24 2,46 
percentage of workers with: 
- lower education -0,00 -0,09 
- medium education 0,14 3,92 
- higher education 0,53 13,68 
(intramural) R&D-intensity 0,15 1,68 
perc. of workers leaving the firm -0,20 -3.07 
Notes: 
R-square: 0,45 
943 observations 
all variables refer to the year 1990 
Table 2/lb Variables that have no systematic influence on wage levels 
percentages of workers following interna! manpower training courses in 1990; 
percentages of workers newly hired in 1990; 
log of the number of workers in the establishment; 
dummy for firms indicating that they had introduced a new process technology during 
the past two years; 
dummy for firms claiming an 'advanced position in the field of mechanization and 
automatization'. 
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Important in the context of this paper is the finding that, after control for such variables, 
product- and process-related intramural R&D both have a positive influence on wages. If a 
firm's total intramural R&D intensity increases by one percentage point, wage levels in-
creaseby 0,15%. 
Dividing intramural R&D into product- and process-related R&D and adding both variables 
in turn to our equation, we find that they both have a significantly positive influence on 
wages: coefficients are 0,25 (t-value: 2,16) for interna! product-R&D intensity and 0,72 (t-
value: 2,93) for internal process-R&D intensity. If the two variables are included together in 
the equation, internal product-related R&D becomes insignificant due to multicollinearity 
(the R-square between the two is 0,30). Some multicollinearity between R&D intensity and 
educational levels may also be expected. If intramural product- and process-R&D intensity 
are included in the equation and educational variables are omitted, the result is a significant 
coëfficiënt for both intramural product- (coëfficiënt: 0,51, t-value: 3,80) and process-R&D 
intensity (0,96, t-value: 3,37). However, this model is not such a good predictor of average 
wage levels, the R-square being 0,29. Seemingly, educational levels are more important than 
R&D for wages. 
The most remarkable result is that a positive impact on wages is achieved by both product-
and process-related R&D, the latter being even more important than the former. In this con-
text, it should be noted that two qualitative process innovation variables have no systematic 
impact on wages: (1) firms that indicated that they had introduced a novel process technol-
ogy during 1988-90, and (2) firms claiming that they held an 'advanced position in the field 
of mechanization and automatization' do not pay systematically higher (or lower) wages. 
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The discrepancy between process-related R&D and the two qualitative variables can be ex-
plained as follows. Process-related R&D requires a substantial investment in knowledge by 
the firm itself. To the extent that this knowledge is 'embodied' in the heads of people, the 
firm has an interest in minimizing the risk of their leaving by paying higher wages. The 
need to prevent the leaking of (tacit) knowledge may be less urgent in the case of an 'intro-
duction of a new process technology' or for an 'advanced position in the field of mechaniza-
tion and automatization', as this may often be based on the acquisition of new equipment 
and less on the firm's development efforts. 
Our finding that process-related R&D has no impact on profits but does have a positive im-
pact on wages is a little harder to explain. One explanation may be that process-R&D often 
serves to meet tougher environmental standards. As the principal aim is to improve the envi-
ronment, such R&D need not have a systematic impact on productivity or profitability. 
Nevertheless, it requires highly skilled labour with specialist knowledge. A different but not 
necessarily competing explanation is that firms that concentrate on process technology have 
made the strategie choice to produce fairly simple Standard products that can be produced at 
low cost due to modern process technology. Such products may often compete with similar 
products from low wage countries, which may explain the relatively low profits. 
Finally, Table 2/2 summarizes our estimates of wage level determinants for the year 1988. 
In spite of some differences in the specification of our regression equation (due to data avai-
lability), quite similar results are found with respect to educational levels and age classes. 
Among the variables added in 1988 (and not available in 1990) the following are worth men-
tioning. Trade unionization (i.e. percentages of trade union members in the firm) has a sig-
nificantly positive impact on wages. This also holds for the growth of employment at the 
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firm level. Moreover, as in the equation for 1990 (Table 2/1), firm size has little systematic 
impact on wages. In the 1988 cross-section, firm size (i.e. numbers of employees) was 
approached in two ways: the size of the entire firm (i.e. the principal establishment) and the 
size of the establishment or branch plant (being part of a larger unit). In both years, the size 
of the establishment (as part of a larger unit) proves insignificant. However, in 1988 the size 
of the (total) firm (not available in the 1990 data) is (weakly) significant at 89%. Again, 
R&D intensity has a positive impact on wages, aldiough it should be noted that it is signifi-
cant only at a 90% level. 
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Table 2/2 Variables that influenced the log of average wages paid by a fïrm in 1988. 
Summary of regressions 
independent variables: 
constant term 
percentage of male workers 
percentage of workers participating in: 
- external training courses 
- internal training courses 
percentage of workers who changed to 
a different department or function 
percentage of workers in age groups: 
- under than 20 years 
- 20-29 years 
- 30-39 years 
- 40-49 years 
percentage of workers with: 
- lower education 
- medium education 
- higher education 
intramural R&D intensity 
percentage of workers leaving the fïrm 
percentage of trade union members 
job growth in the fïrm during 1986-88 
firm size (log of number of workers) 
:ients: t-values 
7,54 108,94 
0,16 6,81 
0,05 1,25 
-0,05 -1,71 
-0,16 -2,01 
-0,14 -1,35 
-0,01 -0,15 
0,23 3,33 
0,21 2,38 
0,08 2,48 
0,16 4,79 
0,54 15,05 
0,24 1,79 
0,03 0,55 
0,04 1,87 
0,11 3,37 
0,004 1,60 
Notes: 
R-square: 0,40; 
954 observations; some firms with an R&D intensity of >30% have been deleted as 
outlyers; 
all variables refer to 1988; 
some t-values may be exceptionally high as the method of 'pairwise' (instead of 
'listwise') deletion was used in dealing with missing values. 
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